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ABSTRACT
HOW COMMUNICATION AND CONFIRMATORY STRATEGIES
AFFECT THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
by
Michael E. Gorman
University of New Hampshire, May, 1981
Scientific reasoning has become a topic of recent psy
chological research.

Studies have focused on Karl Popper's

idea that scientists should try to falsify, or disconfirm,
their hypotheses instead of verifying them.

Results indi

cate that both scientists and college students prefer to use
confirmatory logic on simple tasks that model scientific
reasoning.

The only attempt to instruct subjects to use

disconfirmatory reasoning failed (Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney,
1977) though subjects that falsified on their own initiative
were more successful than subjects who tried to confirm.
All the studies of scientific reasoning have focused on
individuals.

But major advances in science are often made

by groups, e.g., the research teams that discovered the
structure of DNA and developed the atomic bomb.

Experimental

studies of group problem-solving have compared the perfor
mance of interacting groups with that of concocted groups com
posed of an equal number of individuals working separately.
When there is a single, right answer to a problem, interacting
vii

groups perforin about as well as the best member of each
equally large concocted group, but better than the average
person working alone.
This thesis synthesizes the literatures on scientific
reasoning and group problem-solving by combining their two
major variables in a single study.

Commun icat ion was mani

pulated by running subjects in groups of four and either tel
ling them to interact or to work separately.

Strategy was

manipulated by instructing subjects to follow either dis
confirmatory or confirmatory approaches to the task, which
was based on New Eleusis, a card-game designed to model the
"search for truth."

Each group had to solve the same four

increasingly difficult Eleusis problems.
The overall design was a 2 (interacting vs. non
interacting) X 2 (disconfirmatory vs. confirmatory) X 4
(the Eleusis problems) split plot.

Analyses-of-variance were

conducted on the number of correct solutions and the time-tosolution achieved by groups in each condition.
Even though a manipulation-check revealed that discon
firmatory groups did try to follow their suggested strategy,
there were no significant differences in the performances
of confirmatory and disconfirmatory groups.

This result

replicates Mynatt et al.'s (1977) earlier research.
Interacting groups performed no better than the best
member of each non-interacting group, where the best is de
fined as the person who solved each rule in the least time.
Interacting groups also took significantly more time.
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But

interacting groups did solve a significantly higher percen
tage of problems (80%) than all non-interacting individuals
combined (33%).

These results replicate earlier research on

group problem-solving (Steiner, 1972).
A follow-up study, using the same task and interacting
groups, revealed that disconfirmatory instructions produce
superior performance when subjects have maximum freedom to
design their own experiments.

When the range of possible

experiments is limited, confirmatory groups may serendipitously disconfirm their hypotheses.
A discussion of the implications of these results for
science and suggestions for future research were included in
the thesis.

INTRODUCTION

The focus of the thesis presented here is an experimen
tal investigation of how two factors affect groups' attempts
to solve a series of problems that model scientific reason
ing.

The paper is divided into four sections.

The first

section, "Studies of Scientific Reasoning," contains the
background and rationale for the present study.

The second

section, "Methods," describes the details of the design and
the third section, "Results," contains the quantitative
findings.

The final, "Discussion" section ties the results

back in with themes presented in the first section.

I.

STUDIES OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING

In the last 100 years, with the development of satel
lites, atomic energy, skyscrapers, radio and television,
etc., the human environment has changed more than in the
preceding 10,000.

These changes have not affected all parts

of the world equally:

the developing nations have been less

affected than the industrial ones.

But most people now live

in a very different world than the one their grandparents
were born into.
Science has played a major role in all these changes.
2

The classic example is Einstein's E=MC , a purely theoretical
equation.

It never occurred to Einstein that his formula

could actually be applied to a technological problem.

But

at Hiroshima, Einstein's equation was translated into action—
with horrifying results.
Science is not solely responsible for major advances
in technology.

Animal husbandrists had developed excellent

breeding techniques long before Darwin and Mendel explained
how their techniques worked.

But the more recent discovery

of the structure of DNA has opened the way to a whole set of
applications that would have been impossible without that
major scientific advance.

Sometimes the scientific advance

follows the technological one— but usually the order is
reversed.
To understand the new world created by technology, it
2
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is necessary to understand science.

Modern scholars in var

ious disciplines have begun to study science in earnest.
Gerald Holton (1973), Thomas Kuhn (1970) and others have
thoroughly demolished the notion that science progresses in
an orderly linear fashion, with one discovery leading inevi
tably to the next.
The progress of Science is generally regarded as a kind
of clean, rational advance along a straight ascending
line; in fact it has followed a zig-zag course, at times
almost more bewildering than the evolution of political
thought. The history of cosmic theories, in particular,
may without exaggeration be called a history of collec
tive obsessions and controlled schizophrenias; and the
manner in which some of the most important individual
discoveries were arrived at reminds one more of a sleep
walker's performance than an electronic brain's
(Koestler, 1963, p. 15).
Koestler exaggerates the irrational element in science, but
even scientists themselves have little sympathy with tradi
tional views of the scientist.

As Agnew and Pyke (1969)

note, "We suspect that there are those who . . . will say
that the researcher must be completely dedicated to objec
tivity, that he is only interested in the truth.
there are researchers like that.

Perhaps

We haven't met enough to

fill a phone booth" (p. 162).
Scientists are not totally objective, dispassionate ob
servers and science has not progressed in a completely ration
al manner.

But there has been progress:

modern scientific

theories can predict and explain a much wider range of events
than their predecessors of a hundred years ago.

The modern

theory of plate tectonics, for example, accounts for a mass
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of geological data that no previous theory could have handled
(Gould, 1977).
Falsification as a Demarcation Between
Science and Non-Science
The philosopher Karl Popper (1962, 1976) concedes that
the way in which scientific discoveries are made is often
non-rational.

But he claims the way in which they are tested

is rational— or at least potentially rational.

Einstein's

General Theory of Relativity is Popper's favorite example.
When he proposed the theory, Einstein also proposed an empir
ical

test that could refute it.

He predicted that beams from

a distant star would be bent a certain amount by the sun's
gravitational field.

During an eclipse, the British physi

cist A. S. Eddington found that light from a star near the
sun was bent by the sun's gravity in the manner predicted by
Einstein.

General Relativity had not been disconfirmed by

an empirical test.
Note that it is not correct to say that Einstein's theory
had been confirmed by an empirical observation.

That is the

logical fallacy called 'affirming the consequent.'

Another

theory can always be constructed that will make the same pre
diction.

In fact, other hypotheses besides Einstein's have

been proposed that account for Eddington's observation
(Kaufmann, 1973).
Restating the problem in logical terms will make it
clearer.

Scientific predictions are "if, then" statements:

if hypothesis p is true, then event q will be observed.

5

There are or.ly two forms of valid arguments involving one
if, then statement and another, non-binary statement:
/

1.

Modus ponens:

Hypothesis p is true.

Then event q will

be observed.
2.

Modus tollens:

Event q is not observed when hypothesis

p predicts it should be.

Then p is false.

If q is observed, that says nothing about whether p is
true.

An alternative hypothesis h might also predict that q

would have occurred.
Popper's point is that modus tollens is the only viable
form of scientific inference for testing hypotheses.

Even

modus ponens isn't useful because a scientist cannot know
a priori that a hypothesis is true.

The logical conclusion

is that a hypothesis can never be proved right, but it can
withstand repeated attempts to prove it wrong using modus
tollens.
Another line of reasoning that supports Popper's can
be derived from Hume's critique of induction (Popper, 1962).
Put simply, Hume showed that one can never infer truth about
the future by observation, because one cannot assume the
future will be like the past.

"Bertrand Russell once specu

lated that the chicken on slaughter-day might reason that
whenever the humans came it had been fed, so when the humans
would come today it would also be fed.

The chicken thought

that the future would resemble the past, but it was dead
wrong" (Skyrms, 1966, p. 27).

In the same way, even though

scientific equations have given accurate predictions in the
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past, we can never be absolutely sure they will continue to
do so in the future.
Again, the point is that no amount of evidence will
prove that a theory about the universe is right, but one con
tradictory piece of evidence can prove it wrong.

So, despite

Hume's critique, scientific progress is still possible.
What scientists should do is develop theories that make falsifiable predictions and then try to disprove them.

Those

theories that are not falsified represent the closest ap
proximations to the truth available.

Eventually, they may

be disproved and replaced by other, better theories that
account for even more evidence.

The classic example is

Newtonian mechanics, which were scientific gospel until
Einstein's General Relativity came along and accounted for
some evidence— like the perturbations in Mercury's orbit—
that Newton's theory could not explain (Einstein and Infeld,
1938) .
How does one distinguish between General Relativity and
its competitors, if some of the competitors make the same pre
dictions as Einstein's theory?

Popper says that the best

theory is the one which forbids the most, i.e., makes the most
potentially falsifiable predictions.

Theories like Marxism

and psychoanalysis that make no falsifiable predictions are
not scientific.

No matter what neurosis you bring to a

psychoanalyst, he or she will always be able to explain it
in Freudian— or Adlerian, or Jungian— terms.

No matter what

world event occurs, a Marxist will always be able to explain
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it in terms of the struggle between classes.
forbid nothing:
proved.

These theories

they make no predictions that can be dis

Their explanations are deceptive:

they can explain

what has happened, but they cannot make specific, falsifiable
predictions about future events, as Einstein did.
So, according to Popper, the demarcation between science
and non-science is that all scientific theories are falsi
fiable:

they make predictions that potentially can be dis

proved.

Science approaches the truth by discarding ideas that

are wrong, not by proving ideas right.

Even Einstein's

theories may someday be supplanted by better approximations
to the truth.
The fact that many scientific ideas are the products of
intuition rather than reason does not bother Popper.
not matter where a scientific idea comes from:
only that it make falsifiable predictions.

It does

it matters

If the idea is

ridiculous, it will be disproved immediately.
Problems with Popper's Demarcation
Historians of science like Kuhn (1970) have shown not
only that individual scientific ideas often arise from irra
tional sources but also that scientific theories are not
always accepted or rejected based on the science.

For example,

Einstein's special theory of relativity was initially falsi
fied, in an experiment by the eminent physicist Walter
Kaufmann.
Einstein's.

His results supported theories that differed from
Einstein was not at all dismayed; as far as he

was concerned, the ad hoc character of the other theories
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rendered them highly unlikely (Holton, 1973).

About ten

years later, it was discovered that Kaufmann's equipment
had been inadequate to conduct the test.

Einstein had re

fused to let a single experiment sway his opinion, even though
he had agreed that— at the time at least— there were no pro
blems with the way the experiment had been done.
Popper would respond by arguing that falsification is
an ideal.

Whether scientists have practiced it in the past

or not is irrelevant.

The important thing is that they should

practice falsification in the future.
But the Einstein example raises problems with falsifi
cation as an ideal.

Einstein was correct to stick to his

theory despite evidence to the contrary.

Sometimes, falsi-

ficatory evidence should be ignored.
Also, even if we accept falsification as a scientific
ideal, it does not serve to demarcate science from non-science.
There are major scientific areas that are based on nonfalsifiable theories.

Popper himself admits that "Darwinism

is not a testable'scientific theory, but a metaphysical re
search programme— a possible framework for testable scientific
theories" (1976, p. 168).

Like Marxism, Darwinism can be used

to explain any event within its theoretical domain— any new
discovery in the fossil record, any new and strange form of
life.

Evolution cannot be used to predict the specific course

of an organism's development, but it can account for the past
development of any organism.
According to Popper, the only major prediction made by
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Darwin's theory is that changes produced by selection working
on variation will be gradual.

Small variations in an organ

ism are selected by the environment until, over many genera
tions, the species is transformed.

This prediction has not

been falsified by anything in the fossil record.

But it is

hard to derive other testable predictions from evolutionary
theory.
Much of modern biology is based on evolution.
a science?
falsifiable.

Is biology

Not if its major theoretical framework is not
Popper's demarcation excludes biology from the

sciences.
There are theories outside of science that fulfill
Popper's falsification criterion.

Tradition held that the

first five books of the Bible were written by Moses.

This

idea can be translated into a falsifiable hypothesis:

if

the first five books exhibit strong stylistic and thematic
inconsistencies that suggest they were written by several
authors, they could not have been written by Moses.

In

fact, modern Biblical scholars have used this kind of rea
soning to prove that Moses could not have written the first
five books and that at least four different authors are re
sponsible (see The Oxford Annotated Bible, 1962, p. xxiv).
Is Biblical scholarship a science?
How about history?
falsified.

Good historical theories can be

Take, for example, the common notion that

Einstein's theory of special relativity was inspired, in
large part, by the Michelson-Morley experiment.

Gerald Holton
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(1973) showed that Einstein was not even aware of this ex
periment at the time he wrote his famous 1905 paper.
Popper has proposed an ideal:

every scientific theory

should be open to disconfirmation.

But why limit the ideal

to science?

Fields that are not traditionally scientific

can also generate falsifiable hypotheses.
Should scientists— and other scholars— concentrate on
falsifying their theories, rather than verifying them?
Recently, a few researchers have begun to explore this ques
tion— using the scientific method.
Using Science to Study Confirmatory Reasoning
In the preface to his book Scientist as Subject:

The

Psychological Imperative, Michael J. Mahoney (1976) noted
that, "Relative to the last century— or even the last decade
— today's scientists know quite a bit about virtually everythnig on our planet— with one ironic exception.
tion, of course, i£ the scientist" (p. xi).

The excep

According to

him, historians and sociologists have given us mainly "bio
graphies and social systems analyses so that we are still
left with a very meager understanding of the psychology of
the scientist"

(p. xii).

Mahoney and others have recently set out to remedy this
defect by doing experiments and surveys designed to increase
our understanding of how scientists reason.

The focus of

these studies has been on whether scientists— and ordinary
college students— can successfully employ falsification
on problems that model scientific logic.
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Mahoney and Kimper (1976) gave a questionnaire to 400
scientists which included a test of their logical reasoning
skills.

The scientists were asked to pick which of four

types of inference were valid and were given a specific
example to see whether they could use each type correctly.
They were told to assume "if p, then q," then asked which
of the following conclusions were valid:
Observation
P
not-p
q

not-q

Conclusion
q
not-q
P
not-p

Only the first (modus ponens) and fourth (modus tollens) are
valid.

The second is the fallacy called 'affirming the con

sequent' and the third is the fallacy called 'denying the
antecedent.'
The specific example asked scientists to "Assume that
the four boxes which are presented below are actually cards
which each have a letter on one side and a number on the
other side.

You are asked to test the hypothesis that— for

these 4 cards— if a vowel appears on one side, then an even
number will appear on the other side.

Your "testing," of

course, will involve turning one or more cards over"
(Mahoney, 1976, p. 189).

The first box had an e in it, the

second an m, the third an 8 and the fourth a 1_.

The two cri

tical cards are one (modus ponens) and four (modus tollens).
Eighty-two scientists returned the survey.

They included
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physicists, biologists, psychologists and sociologists. "Few
er than eight per cent of the scientists were able to iden
tify the irrelevant 'experiments' in the analogue hypothesistesting task.

Fewer than ten per cent correctly selected the

experiments which had the critical potential of falsifying
the sample hypothesis.

Likewise, although the vast majority

of subjects were able to recognize the validity of modus
ponens (confirmation) and the invalidity of affirming the
consequent, almost 30 per cent of the social scientists in
correctly rated denying the antecedent as a valid form of
reasoning.

Most interesting, perhaps, is the finding that

over half of the scientists did not recognize modus tollens
(disconfirmation) as being logically valid" (Mahoney, 1976,
pp. 192-19 3)..
Mahoney could not guarantee that his sample was repre
sentative, because not all the scientists he contacted re
turned his survey.

But of the ones who did, over half did

not recognize the logical validity of falsification and even
more had trouble applying it in a simple example.
Kern, Mirels and Hinshaw (Note 1) gave a questionnaire
similar to Mahoney's to a sample of seventy-two faculty mem
bers— psychologists, biologists and physicists— from a large
midwestern university.

Half the sample were given logical pro

blems written in abstract form (if p, then q) and half in con
crete form (if Rex is a terrier, then he likes apples).

Kern

et al. used the following problem to express modus tollens in
concrete form (Kern, Mirels & Hinshaw, 1980):

13

"Given:

If Rex is a terrier, then he likes apples.

Observation:
Conclusion:

Rex does not like apples.
a)

Rex is not a terrier.

b)

Rex is a terrier.

c)

Rex likes apples.

d)

None of the conclusions seem to follow
logically" (p. 23).

Thirty per cent of the scientists surveyed did not select
the proper response (a) to the above question, indicating
that they could not correctly apply modus tollens to a speci
fic example.

Half the scientists presented with modus tollens

in its abstract form failed to recognize its logical vali
dity, replicating Mahoney's findings.
was somewhat more representative:

Kern et al.'s sample

all those contacted re

sponded, but all the scientists were from the same university.
The questions used in these surveys are not perfectly
analogous to the research situations faced by working scien
tists.

But it is still surprising that so many respondents

failed to make proper use of falsification, even when given
concrete problems.
Another replication of this pattern of results is pro
vided by Einhorn and Hogarth (19 78) who used a sample of
subjects "known to have been trained in examining possible
disconfirming evidence" (p. 399)— twenty-three statisticians
at the University of London.

Statisticians are formally

trained in hypothesis-testing, including conditions under
which a hypothesis should be rejected.
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Einhorn and Hogarth asked statisticians to indicate
which of four outcomes could be used to evaluate a claim:
"when a particular consultant says themarketwill rise

(i.e.,

a favorable report) it always does rise"(Einhorn &Hogarth,
p. 399).
"1.

The four outcomes were:

favorable report.

2.

unfavorable report.

3.

rise in the market.

4.

fall in the market" (p. 399).
Only five of the statisticians indicated both critical

outcomes:

one (confirmatory) and four (disconfirmatory).

Twelve selected the confirmatory outcome alone.

Like Mahoney's

scientists, most of the statisticians recognized the validity
of modus ponens but not modus tollens.
The confirmatory bias shown by scientists and statis
ticians is shared by college students.
students a

Wason (1977) gave

numerical triad (2, 4, 6) and told them the

triad conformed to a simple mathematical rule.

To discover

the rule, subjects were allowed to try as many other threenumber strings as they wanted, and the experimenter told
them whether each was right or wrong.
singly.

Subjects were run

When each was confident that he or she had discov

ered the rule, he or she told the experimenter.
Out of twenty-nine subjects, twenty-two "announced at
least one incorrect rule, nine of these announced a second
incorrect rule, and two of these nine announced a third
incorrect rule.

Six subjects announced the correct rule
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without any incorrect ones, and the results showed that
these subjects varied their hypotheses much more frequently
than those who announced one incorrect rule" (Wason, 1977,
pp. 308-309).

Most of the students tried to verify their

guesses, instead of falsifying them.

If a student decided

that numbers in a triad must go up by twos, he or she would
often announce several strings like 8, 10, 12 and 4, 6, 8
to test that idea.

When the experimenter confirmed that these

strings were correct, the student often concluded that his
or her guess was correct— even though many alternatives had
not been explored.

The few subjects who got the correct

answer without any incorrect guesses varied their hypotheses
more than the other subjects.

In addition, they used strings

that would tend to disconfirm their guesses, e.g. , 2, 3, 4,
to test whether a difference of two is really necessary.
Finally, these subjects were more conservative about making
a guess; they waited until they had thoroughly tested their
hypotheses before announcing them to the experimenter (see
Wason, 1977, pp. 309-310 for some examples of subjects'
strategies).
Wason's study showed both that college students prefer
confirmatory evidence and that those college students who
tried to disconfirm their ideas did better on a simple
problem-solving task.
Mahoney and DeMonbreun (19 75; reported in Mahoney, 1976)
used Wason's task on a different subject population:

psy

chologists, physical scientists and Protestant ministers.
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They chose fifteen representatives from each group.
only two errorless subjects were ministers.

The

Scientists used

slightly fewer disconfirmatory trials and tended to be more
speculative:

they generated more hypotheses than the minis

ters and returned to a previously falsified hypothesis more
often.

This result contradicts the traditional image of

the scientist as more conservative and cautious about pro
posing new hypotheses.

The small sample-size in Mahoney's

study raises questions about whether it generalizes to the
larger population of scientists, but the results are provo
cative, nonetheless.
Some support for Mahoney's conclusions
another, nonexperimental study.

comes from

Mitroff (19 74) observed

the reactions of forty-two geoscientists to the Apollo
missions.

Many had committed themselves to major hypotheses

concerning what Apollo would find.

Mitroff interviewed

them at various times across the course of the Apollo mis
sions.

He found that some of these scientists tended to

seek evidence confirming their hypotheses and discredited
contradictory evidence.

Like Mahoney's subjects, they stuck

to their hypotheses even after it became apparent that they
had been falsified.

Moreover, a number of scientists ar

gued that this kind of commitment and bias in science was
a good thing.

As noted earlier, initial experimental evi

dence disconfirmed Einstein's special theory of relativity
but he correctly dismissed the evidence.
An elegant study with introductory psychology students
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provides added evidence for a confirmatory bias on the part
of most individuals involved in scientific problem-solving.
Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney (1977) created a scientific 'en
vironment' using a computer terminal which displayed three
shapes:

triangles, squares and discs.

Each shape was either

completely lit or half lit.
Forty-five subjects were seated individually at termi
nals and told how they could make a small lighted dot or
'particle' move across the screen, through a field which con
tained a specific arrangement of triangles, squares and
discs.

Each subject was supposed to come up with a hypothesis

that would account for the motion of the particles.
were given one of three kinds of instructions:

They

disconfirma

tory, confirmatory, or instructions that merely told them
they should test their ideas.

The confirmatory and discon-

firmatory instructions included a historical example of each.
The only rule governing the motion of particles was
that when a particle came within four centimeters of the
center of a half-lit figure, it stopped.

But the environ

ments the subjects faced were arranged so that it appeared
triangles might play some role in stopping motion:

all

triangles that appeared in the first two screens the subjects
faced were either half-lit or within the boundary of a half
lit figure.

As a result, twenty subjects formed initial tri

angle hypotheses, while only twelve had hypotheses concerning
brightness and thirteen had various other ideas.
After their first two screens, subjects were showed
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photographs of other screens— including different arrangements
of shapes and brightness— and asked which ones they would
like to use to test their hypotheses.

Some screens were de

signed so that they would provide confirmatory evidence for
a triangle hypothesis; others were arranged so that it would
be easy to disconfirm such a hypothesis.

Of the twenty sub

jects who decided initially on a triangle hypothesis, fifteen
initially chose confirmatory screens.
tinued:

This tendency con

the twenty 'triangle' subjects selected confirmatory

screens on over seventy per cent of their choices.
Then subjects were given the opportunity to fire parti
cles at either the screens they had chosen or ones they had
not.

Eleven of the 'triangle' subjects obtained evidence

falsifying their hypothesis and ten of these achieved the
correct solution.

Of the other nine, only four were ulti

mately correct.
The instructions to either confirm, disconfirm or test
had no effect on whether individuals arrived at the correct
solution.

The only thing that made a difference was the

initial hypothesis.
away, they got it.

If subjects focused on brightness right
If they focused on something else, they

did considerably worse.
This study supports Wason's observation that introduc
tory psychology students, like scientists, prefer to confirm
hypotheses, rather than falsify them.

In Mynatt et al.'s

study, once subjects obtained evidence falsifying a theory,
they were able to use it.

But in Mahoney's study with
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DeMonbreum (using Wason's task) scientists showed a persis
tent tendency to return to their initial hypotheses, despite
falsifying evidence.

Are introductory psychology students

better able to evaluate disconfirmatory evidence than working
scientists?

Two studies provide too slim a basis for such

a generalization— especially when the studies use entirely
different tasks.

Nonetheless, it is an intriguing finding,

and might be explained by the fact that norms governing pub
lication and advancement in most sciences reward those whose
hypotheses are confirmed.

A study by Spencer, Hartnett and

Mahoney (Note 2) showed that journal referees in psychology
preferred confirmatory results to disconfirmatory ones.
Could scientists be systematically biased towards confirma
tion?
All of the scientific problem-solving studies cited
above concluded that there is a significant advantage to
disconfirmation, even though only two of the studies, Wason's
and Mynatt et al.'s, demonstrated the advantage on an actual
problem-solving task.

Only one study— Mynatt's— actually

involved training subjects to use disconfirmatory reasoning
and the training manipulation in that study produced no ef
fects.

Presumably, subjects ignored it.

need for further research in this area.

Clearly, there is a
If disconfirmation is

the best way to test theories, then one ought to be able to
train subjects to falsify and see that training work when
subjects tackle problems that model scientific reasoning.
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Should Groups Falsify?
All the experimental studies of scientific problem
solving have focused on whether individuals working separ
ately can effectively employ a disconfirmatory strategy.
But some of the most significant advances in science have
been made by groups of scientists working together, including
the development of atomic energy (Sherwin, 1973) and the
discovery of DNA (Judson, 1979) .

There are scientists like

Einstein who do much of their work alone, but even these
'loners' communicate constantly with colleagues through
journals, conferences and correspondence.
Is falsification a practical strategy for every member
of a scientific community?

A number of the scientists stud

ied by Mitroff (1974) argued that researchers should be
committed to their hypotheses and defend them against dis
proof.

Einstein did just that with his theory of special

relativity and his theory was correct, not the experimental
evidence.

As A. S. Eddington remarked, "It is...a good rule

not to put too much confidence in the observational results
that are put forward until they are confirmed by theory"
(quoted in Judson, 1979, p. 93).

There are times when theory

should take precedence over empirical evidence.
If one scientist argues vehemently for his or her hypo
theses ,others will have to provide powerful disconfirmatory
evidence before the theory will be rejected by the scien
tific community.

Rather than having every researcher adopt

a disconfirmatory strategy, it may be better for science to
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operate on this kind of an adversary system, each theory
having its proponents who try to confirm it and its opponents
who try to disprove it.
At this time, it is impossible to say which approach is
best for science.

But it should be apparent that a strategy

that works well for isolated individuals may not work well
for groups.

There is a need for research comparing how

groups use confirmatory and disconfirmatory reasoning.
Unfortunately, none of the studies of scientific reason
ing have included groups.

But there is an extensive litera

ture concerning the advantages and disadvantages of problem
solving in groups.
Group Problem-Solving
Gerald Holton argues that "the contributions of n really
good persons working in related areas of the same field are
likely to be larger (or better) than n times the contribu
tion of any one of them alone in the field.

This is true of

a group as well as of individuals who do not work in physical
proximity to one another" (1973, p. 409).

So, a group of

four scientists working in the same area would make more than
four times the contribution of a single scientist working
alone.
Holton's idea is not entirely supported by experimental
research on group problem-solving, even though none of the
group problem-solving studies have used tasks designed to
model scientific reasoning.

Shaw (19 32) compared the per

formance of four-person groups and individuals working
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separately on the following problem:
On one side of a river are three wives and three husbands.
All of the men but none of the women can row. Get them
all across the river by means of a boat carrying only
three at one time. No man will allow his wife to be in
the presence of another man unless he is also there
(Steiner, 1972, p. 19).
Sixty per cent of the groups solved the problem, as opposed
to only fourteen per cent of the individuals.

In other words,

groups were almost exactly four times as successful as indivi
duals.

Given that there were four people in each group, Shaw's

finding can be interpreted to mean that groups do no better
than the best of an equal number of individuals working separ
ately.

Subsequent research on tasks similar to Shaw's supports

this conclusion (Marquart, 1955; Steiner, 1972).
Type of task is important.

Groups will do better than

an equal number of separate individuals on tasks that are
divisible into sub-tasks, if each group member has special
skills relevant to one or more sub-tasks (Steiner, 1972).

The

team of scientists that developed the atomic bomb is a good
example:

chemists, physicists, engineers and politicians

handled different aspects of this highly complicated, divi
sible task (Sherwin, 1973).

No one scientists or technician

could have come close to solving this problem.
The tasks used by Shaw (1932), Marquart (1955) and others
— on which groups did only as well as the best of an equal
number of individuals working separately— are not divisible.
They are what Steiner (1972) calls 'Eureka' problems:

the

solution comes to a single person in a 'flash' of insight.
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Lorge and Solomon created a mathematical model to pre
dict group performance on a Eureka task.

"If, in a given

population, the proportion of people not possessing the
ability . . . is Q, the probability of drawing at random from
the population

a

single

person who will not have the abil

ity to solve the problem is Q.

The probability that nobody

in a randomly assigned group of size n will have the ability
to solve the problem is Qn , and the probability that at least
one member of the group will be able to solve it is 1-Qn .
Thus, if the presence of at least one competent member is
sufficient to guarantee group success, the proportion of
successful groups will equal 1-Qn " (Steiner, 1972, p. 20).
In Shaw's study, the proportion of individuals who
solved the problem working alone was .14, so P=.14 and Q=.86.
Since there were four members in each of Shaw's groups, the
probability that at least one member of each group would
4
solve the problem was 1-(.14) , or .596. The actual propor
tion of groups that solved was .6, so the Lorge-Solomon model
is a good predictor in this case.

The model has been suc

cessfully applied to other, similar studies (Steiner, 1972).
Holton's remark that "the contributions of n really good
persons working in related areas of the same field are likely
to be larger (or better) than n times the contribution of
any one of them alone in the field" would seem to hold true
for divisible tasks, but not for 'Eureka' problems that can
be solved by one individual's insight.

A good example of

such a Eureka insight is Einstein's special theory of
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relativity.

He exposed some serious logical inconsistencies

in the physics of his day and resolved them by means of a
dramatic new theory (Holton, 1973).

One of the paradoxes

that absorbed Einstein was how a beam of light would look if
he could run as fast as it.

It had never occurred to any

one else to puzzle over such a problem.

This kind of imagina

tion was critical to the development of the special theory
of relativity.
Therefore, it appears that scientific problems which
require a kind of 'Eureka' insight can be solved at least as
easily by a talented individual as by a group.

Scientific

problems that can be divided into sub-tasks are much easier
for groups to solve— because each member of the group can
focus on part of the problem.

But these conclusions should

be subjected to further experimental test, because none of
the group problem-solving studies have used tasks specifically
designed to model scientific reasoning and/or have included
scientists as subjects.
The Present Study
So far, we have discussed two separate experimental re
search traditions:
problem-solving.

falsification by individuals, and group
The present study is an attempt to combine

elements of both in a single experiment.
Why an experiment?

The advantage of using a laboratory

simulation of science is that one can manipulate variables
like type of strategy while eliminating the effects of other
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variables via control procedures.

It is hard to disentangle

the effects of one variable from another in the 'real world1;
proper laboratory procedures permit a clear test of how, for
example, confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies affect
performance on a particular problem.
The disadvantage of experiments is that laboratory simu
lations are not perfect models of the things they are design
ed to simulate.

One usually sacrifices realism for control

in an experiment.
The obvious solution to this dilemma is to tackle a
problem using multiple methods— experiments, surveys, bio
graphies, historical studies, interviews, etc.

Since there

are few experimental studies of scientific problem-solving,
and no studies concerning how groups solve scientific pro
blems , I chose to do an experiment involving groups and a
task that models scientific reasoning.
To combine the two research traditions discussed earlier,
the experiment presented here involved manipulation of three
variables.
(1)

Strategy:

To see whether falsification is an effective

strategy for individuals working in communication with one
another, groups of four subjects were told to adopt either
a confirmatory or a disconfirmatory strategy on a task that
models scientific reasoning.
(2)

Communication:

To see whether individuals working to

gether would do better than individuals working separately,
subjects were run in either of two kinds of groups.

Members

of interacting groups worked together and discussed ideas
freely.

Members of co-acting groups worked separately and

kept their guesses to themselves.
So, each group of four subjects was assigned to one of
four conditions:

1.

an interacting group told to use a

disconfirmatory strategy; 2.

an interacting group told to

use a confirmatory strategy; 3.
4.

co-acting/confirmatory.

co-acting/disconfirmatory;

All subjects were run under the

same conditions on the third variable.
(3)

Task;

The task used in the present study had to fulfill

four requirements:
(a)

It had to be a good model of scientific reasoning, parti

cularly of the Eureka-type, because most previous studies of
scientific problem-solving had used Eureka problems.
(b)

It had to be simple, so subjects could potentially solve

it in the short time they would be together in the labora
tory.
(c)

It had to be divisible into a sequence of related sub

tasks that increased in difficulty, so groups could gain
experience working together on simpler problems before tack
ling harder ones.
(d)

Like Wason1s and Mynatt et al.'s tasks, the one used in

the present study had to permit subjects to perform experi
ments to test their guesses.

Subjects should be able to de

sign both confirmatory and disconfirmatory experiments.
Fortunately, such a task exists.
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New Eleusis
The card game "New Eleusis," as described by Martin
Gardner in one of his Scientific American columns (October,
19 77), is explicitly designed to model the "search for
truth."

"...Eleusis is of special interest to mathematicians

and scientists because it provides a model of induction,
the process at the very heart of the scientific method...
Eleusis was invented in 1956 by Robert Abbott...He had been
studying that sudden insight into the solution of a problem
that psychologists sometimes call the 'Aha' reaction.

Great

turning points in science often hinge on these mysterious
intuitive leaps.

Eleusis turns out to be a fascinating sim

ulation of this facet of science"

(Gardner, 1977, p. 18).

Here is a task that fulfills requirement (a):
the Eureka aspect of scientific reasoning.
played by four or five people.

it models

Eleusis is usually

The dealer makes up a rule

that determines when a card will be right and when it will
be wrong.

Rules can be simple or complex, straightforward

or ambiguous; therefore, Eleusis fulfills requirement (b).
The other players take turns playing cards, with the dealer
telling them which are right and which are wrong.

Correct

cards continue in a straight line; incorrect cards are placed
at right angles, under the card they followed.
For example, if the rule is "red and black cards must
alternate," the sequence might end up looking something like
this after a few cards had been played:
diamonds, S=spades, Q=queen)

(H=hearts, D=
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10H

5C

2D

7S

4H

9S

7D

QC

QD

3C

9D

QC
6S

Players can always see the results of each others' past
card plays, or experiments.
Requirement (c) was fulfilled by designing a set of
four relatively simple rules that increased in difficulty,
with solutions to later, more complex rules building off
solutions to the earlier, simpler ones.

In this way, inter

acting groups, like scientific research teams, could gain
experience working together, starting with simpler problems
and building to more complex ones.
Martin Gardner claims that Eleusis "provides a model of
induction, the process at the very heart of the scientific
method."

But Hume and Popper have raised serious question

about induction:

it is not a truly valid form of inference

and most scientists don't really use it (Popper, 1962).
Scientists don't merely 'observe':

they look at the data in

the light of hypotheses they have already formed.
If Eleusis is a good model of induction, then it is not
a good model of the ideal scientific procedure, as Popper
sees it.

The game is structured so that players are rewarded

for getting cards right, which is why it is best played using
a kind of inductive, confirmatory strategy:

if your idea for

a rule generates right answers, keep playing it.

In most

sciences, those whose experiments confirm their hypotheses
are much more likely to get published and advance in their
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field (Spencer, Hartnett & Mahoney, 1980).

So the emphasis

on right answers in Eleusis may be a realistic simulation
of the way science is conducted, but it does not conform to
the Popperian ideal.
Fortunately, it is possible to transform Eleusis so that
players will not be rewarded or punished for following any
particular strategy— or even rewarded for following a discon
firmatory strategy.

Eleusis makes a very flexible task:

with only a few modifications, it can be changed from a model
of induction to a model of falsification by requiring play
ers to write out their hypotheses, then test them by playing
cards that should be wrong.

In this way, Eleusis can be made

to fulfill requirement (d).
Speculations Concerning the Results
Interacting groups could potentially pursue a discon
firmatory strategy more consistently than co-acting groups,
because interacting group members could learn to coordinate
efforts on the earlier, easier rules, so that by the later
rules, they would be falsifying systematically.

In co-acting

groups, each individual would be more likely to pursue his
or her own strategy, independently of other group members.
So, if Popper's ideas concerning the advantages of fal
sification are correct, then interacting groups trained to
falsify have the potential to do better than co-acting groups.
Conversely, interacting groups trained to confirm should do
worse than co-acting, because group members will be consis
tently pursuing a disadvantageous strategy.
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Of course, all of this assumes that interacting group
members will be able to coordinate efforts.

The literature

on group problem-solving indicates that there are many situa
tions in which the processes by which an interacting group
arrives at a decision are so inefficient that the group per
forms much worse than one would expect (Steiner, 1972;
Hoffman, 1979).
Three Comparisons Between Interacting and Co-Acting Groups
There are three comparisons that should be made across
the intragroup communications variable.
Interacting groups vs. the best co-actor on each rule.
Will the best individual in each co-acting group on each sub
task perform better than the interacting groups?

Marquart

(1955) found that on a single task, there was no difference
in performance between an interacting group and the best of
an equal number of individuals.

So if we compare performance,

sub-task by sub-task, looking to see if any member of each
co-acting group solved each rule, there should be no differ
ence between interacting and co-acting groups.
Interacting groups vs. the best co-actor across the four
rules.

Will interacting groups perform better than the best

individual in each co-acting group when best is defined as
the person who solves the most rules?

Steiner (1972) argues

that, on a task that is divisible into sub-tasks, interacting
groups will perform better than an equal number of individuals
working separately.

The four Eleusis rules used in the present

31

study can be viewed as parts of a single, divisible task be
cause the rules are related:
easier to solve the next.

solving each rule makes it

If we take the member of each co

acting group who does the best across all four rules, his or
her performance should be worse than that of an interacting
group— because in an interacting group, one person can solve
the first rule, share his or her solution with the others and
make it possible for someone else to solve the second rule.
Do interacting groups solve a higher percentage of pro
blems than co-actors?

This comparison comes closest to

Marjorie Shaw's (1932) observation that groups solved a higher
percentage of problems than individuals working separately.
In the present study, Shaw's finding should certainly be re
plicated:

the proportion of successful interacting groups

should be much greater than the proportion of successful co
acting individuals.

But the co-acting individuals are not

working in complete isolation.
of information with each other.

They do share a certain amount
So the results of the present

study might differ from Shaw's.
One other dependent variable that is commonly studied in
the literature is time to solution.

Individuals working

separately are almost always faster than interacting groups
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1969).
the present study:

This relationship should hold in

those co-acting individuals who solve

the problem should take less time than groups working togeth
er.

Co-actors should also take less time to make a decision

concerning when to give up and admit they can't solve the
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problem.

Groups are rarely efficient in terms of time.

Their main advantage— when they have one at all— is in terms
of quality of solution.
How the Present Study Relates to the Practice of Science
The laboratory simulation of scientific problem-solving
presented here is a very simplified model of scientific pro
cesses in the real world.

The interacting/co-acting comparison

is analogous to a comparison between research teams that work
together and scientists that see only the results of each
others' experiments in journals.

The confirmatory/disconfir-

matory comparison is analogous to a comparison between sci
entists who seek to verify hypotheses and scientists who try
to disprove them.

But the analogy is weak— especially as the

subjects in the present study will be introductory psychology
students, not scientists.
The game "New Eleusis" is a good model of scientific
problem-solving (Romesburg, 1979).

But the four rules used

in the present study are much simpler than most real scienti
fic problems.

Eleusis rules of great complexity could be

developed for use in future studies, but it seemed better to
begin with relatively simple ones that most college students
could potentially solve in a short time.
So, the results of the present study can only be gener
alized to the process of scientific discovery with the
greatest caution.

The laboratory is a long way from reality.

But this study is intended as only the first, exploratory
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step towards more realistic experimental simulations of
science.

Eventually, scientists themselves can be brought

into the laboratory and ashed to solve Eleusis rules of
enormous complexity.

Simulations of the growth and develop

ment of science could be set-up, using college students.
The possibilities are endless.

The main purpose of the pre

sent study will be to suggest fruitful lines of inquiry for
future research.

II.

Methods

Subjects
One-hundred-and-seventy-two introductory psychology
students at the University of New Hampshire participated in
this experiment.

They were run in groups of four.

An effort

was made to insure that there were two males and two females
in each group.

On rare occasions, three members of one sex

and one of another had to be run.

All subjects were randomly

assigned to one of the four possible combinations of the
Strategy and Communication variables.
Data from three groups (twelve subjects) had to be drop
ped because of procedural errors made by the experimenter.
Procedures
Each subject was handed one of four cards marked "I,"
"J," "K," or "L" before he or she entered the experimental
room.

The letters corresponded to seats around a rectangular

table.

Same-sex pairs were handed either I and K or J and L

to insure that they faced each other.
Once all subjects were seated, the experimenter handedout written instructions and read them aloud.

The first

sheet of instructions concerned the task subjects were going
to have to perform.

The game "NewEleusis," discussed in

the last section, was modified to fit the needs of the pre
sent experiment.

Subjects were told that they would be

dealt a hand of thirteen cards from a shuffled deck.
34

Each
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person would then play a card, in order.

After a card was

laid on the table, the experimenter would indicate whether it
was right or wrong and put it in the appropriate place in the
sequence.

Correct cards would continue in a straight line;

incorrect cards would go off at right angles.
The experimenter then showed subjects an example of a
simple rule:

"red and black cards must alternate."

Subjects

were also made aware of the numerical values of the cards:
Ace is a one, Jack is an eleven, Queen is a twelve and King
is a thirteen.
The first sheet of instructions concluded by pointing
out that there would be four separate tasks.

Subjects would

play sixty cards on each and be limited to half-an-hour in
which to guess the rule.

To make sure subjects always had

a card to play, each time a person played a card that was
wrong, he or she would begiven two additional cards.

It

was

emphasized that this was not a penalty or punishment of any
kind; in fact, the more cards one had, the better off one
was.
The next sheet of instructions gave subjects specific
directions for writing-out their guesses, including how to
put down the time and card number on which they made their
guess.

When the group or an individual got ready to make a

guess, they told the experimenter, who read them the time and
made sure they had the correct card number.

Time was measured

in five-second intervals on a Hewlett-Packard 67 calculator,
which has a timing program.

The time provided a measure of
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speed to solution, while the number of cards provided a rough
measure of the amount of information available as of each
guess.

Subjects were also told they would not get any feed

back on whether their guesses were right or wrong until the
end of the experiment.
Independent Variables
After the procedure for making guesses was explained to
subjects, including the fact that they could make as many
guesses as they wanted, subjects were either told to make
their guesses as a group (interacting condition) or keep track
of their guesses separately (co-acting condition).

In the

former case, it was emphasized that subjects should discuss
their ideas freely and even make suggestions concerning what
card should be played next.

In the latter case, it was em

phasized that subjects should not say anything to one another
about their guesses or ideas.
Next, subjects were given a final sheet which contained
a list of "Good Strategies for Guessing Patterns."
groups were urged to "guess early, guess often."

First, all
It was hoped

that this suggestion would encourage subjects to leave a
record of all their ideas on each task.
Second, half the groups were urged to "systematically
test your guesses by looking carefully at previous mistakes
and by playing cards you are sure will be wrong."

The other

half were told nothing about mistakes and urged to test their
guesses by playing cards they were sure would be right.

The

former strategy is disconfirmatory, the latter confirmatory.
Upon completing the instruction, subjects began on the
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four rules.

In the order in which subjects saw them, they

were:
1.

The next card must be one higher or lower than the pre

ceding card.
2.

The next card must be the same as, one higher or lower

than, or two higher or lower than the preceding card.
3.

Odd and even cards must alternate:

an even card can never

follow an even card and an odd card can never follow an odd
card.
4.

Cards can alternate odd-even, or red-black, or both.

If

an even card follows an even card of the same color, or an
odd card follows an odd card of the same color, it is wrong.
Any other two-card combination is possible.
The first three rules all concern the numerical values
of the cards and can be solved by focusing on the differences
between two adjacent cards.

Even the third rule can be

stated in terms of differences:

if the difference between

two adjacent cards is odd, one will be odd and the other will
be even.
The fourth rule combines two dimensions— color and
number— and can be solved only by attending to both of them
at the same time.

But both dimensions are ones the subjects

have encountered previously.

The odd-even dimension formed

the basis for the preceding rule, and alternating colors
was used in the initial instructions as an example of how
Eleusis is played.
If subjects adopt a purely confirmatory strategy, they
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can generate right answers to all four rules by playing ac
cording to the first rule:
difference of one.

cards must be separated by a

Information derived solely from right

answers will be misleading.

To guess the four rules cor

rectly, subjects will have to make use of information derived
from mistakes.

Hence, a disconfirmatory strategy should be

superior to a confirmatory one.
Dependent Measures
The term dependent is used to refer to the class of
variables that are dependent on subjects' responses.

Four

measures were used to assess subjects' performance:
1.

The guesses:

For purposes of analysis, correct guesses

were coded as ones and incorrect guesses are zeroes.

A re

cord was kept of all individual guesses in the co-acting con
dition and all group guesses in the interacting condition.
2.

Number of cards:

Each time subjects wrote down a guess,

they also wrote down the number of cards that had been played
on that rule as of the point where they made the guess.

There

fore, card totals could be anywhere between one and sixty.
3.

Time to solution:

Every time subjects made a guess, they

also wrote down the time, in seconds, that had elapsed since
the beginning of that rule.

Separate times were therefore

available for each of the four rules.
4.

Mistakes:

The total number of cards each group got wrong

on each rule was noted.

This record provided a manipulation-

check for the strategy condition:

disconfirmatory groups

should make more mistakes than confirmatory.
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In addition to the performance measures, all groups were
tape-recorded to provide information about group processes.'*'
After subjects had completed the four tasks, they were
given a questionnaire which asked them about their previous
experience with card games, the number of science and math
courses they had taken in college, their reactions to the task
and whether they had found the suggestions concerning strat
egies helpful.

Information regarding their major, their class

in college (freshman, sophomore, etc.) and whether they had
a close friend in the group was also obtained.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were debriefed
and sworn to secrecy.

The debriefing included a review of the

procedures, the correct solutions to the rules and the ration
ale behind the design.

It should be emphasized that this was

the only time subjects were given any feedback on their
guesses.

After the debriefing, subjects were thanked for

their participation.
Overview of the Design
The design is what Winer (1971) calls a three factor
experiment with repeated-measures on one factor.
two between-group factors:
communication.

There are

type of strategy and intragroup

The task is a within-group factor:

all groups

get the same task and within each group the task is varied
in the same way— by splitting it into four rules.

The fact

^"Unfortunately, due to a lack of experimental assistants,
tapes could not be coded so as to provide quantitative infor
mation concerning the kinds of remarks made by specific in
dividuals.
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that subjects' performance on the task is assessed four times
makes task a repeated-measures factor.
So, the design is a 2 X 2 X 4, with 2 (interacting or
co-acting) by 2 (confirmatory or disconfirmatory) levels of
the two between-group factors and 4 (the four Eleusis rules)
levels of one within-group factor.

III.

Results

Each of the three major dependent measures was analyzed
using a 2 X 2 X 4 split-plot analysis-of-variance.

This

technique is described in Winer (1971, pp. 559-571) and Kirk
(1968, pp. 283-294).
Questionnaire data was analyzed via a series of linear
regressions.
Interacting Groups Vs. the Best Co-Actor on Each Rule
The first ANOVA compares the number of correct solutions
obtained by interacting groups to the number of correct solu
tions obtained by the best co-acting individual on each rule,
where best is defined as the person who solves each rule
using the least cards and taking the least time.

If only one

co-actor solved each rule in a particular group, the group's
score was all ones— even if a different person was success
ful on each task.

This comparison is most rigorous, in that

it demands interacting groups perform better than any co
acting individual.
The ANOVA table:
Source

SS

df

F

C

.10

1

.46

S

.02

1

.11

CS

.40

1

Er

7.95

36

41

1. 8

42

SS

Source
T

df

F

2. 87

3

6.21

CT

.30

3

.65

ST

.47

.3

1.03

CST

.20

3

.43

16.65

108

Er

The only significant effect on this comparison is a
main-effect for task.

Neither the strategy nor communication

variables significantly affected the number of correct solu
tions a group obtained.
A look at the actual number of successful solutions (where
ten is the highest possible number) shows the task effect
clearly:
Rule

1

2

3

4

Disconfirmatory

9

8

7

6

Confirmatory

9

9

9

6

Disconfirmatory

8

10

7

7

Confirmatory

8

9

7

3

34

36

30

22

Interacting

Co-acting

Reading horizontally, one can see that the number of successes
decreases as rule increases.

But, except on task four, the

number of successes are relatively equal across the other
two factors.

Only on task four is there any appearance of a

difference due to either the communication or strategy vari
ables.

In the co-acting confirmatory condition, only three
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groups solved the fourth rule.

But a separate ANOVA of solu

tions on rule four revealed no significant effects (see
Appendix for source table).

This means that we cannot be

sure that the difference between the co-acting confirmatory
groups and other groups on rule four wasn't simply due to
chance.
There is one major problem with assessing the effects
of the task in the present study.

The fact that performance

declined across the four rules could be due either to fatigue
or an increase in rule-difficulty.

Given that the effects of

fatigue and practice might be expected to cancel each other
out, however, it is likely that the main effect for task re
flects an actual increase in the difficulty of the rules.
Analyses were also done on the number of cards and the
amount of time (in seconds) it took successful groups to reach
a solution.

The number of cards is a rough measure of the

amount of information each of the successful interacting groups
and best co-acting individuals needed.

This ANOVA was con

ducted in a slightly different way than the standard repeatedmeasures approach we have talked about all along.

A repeated-

measures analysis is not appropriate because most groups solved
less than four rules, and consequently did not have scores on
all four levels of the repeated measure.

So a standard

between-groups analysis was done, using the strategy and
communication factors and treating the number of cards each
group required to solve each rule as independent scores.
were potentially forty such scores in each cell (four per
group) but in fact each cell had less.

There
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The two independent variables had no effect on the num
ber of cards required to reach a solution (see Appendix for
source table).

Those disconfirmatory groups that solved

rules required no more information than confirmatory; simi
larly interacting groups required just as much information as
co-acting groups.

But remember, amount of information is

also dependent on the kind of cards that have been played.
One card that disproves a false theory can be worth thirty
cards that appear to confirm it.
A similar analysis was performed using time-in-seconds
as the dependent variable.

Again, each individual time-to-

solution was treated as a separate score, not as one of a
series of four repeated-measures.

The analysis turned up a

significant main-effect for the communication variable:
Source

ss

df

F

C

674961

1

5.12*

S

1210

1

.009

CS

145

1

.001

Er

156837484

119

The tiny F-ratios for the Strategy main-effect and the inter
action indicate that the time data may not be normally distri
buted.

So, both time and card data were transformed to make

their distributions more normal in shape.

Analyses of trans

formed scores produced the same effects as those of untrans
formed scores (see Appendix for details and source tables).
Interacting groups took an average of 583.5 seconds to
reach a solution.

The best co-acting individuals took an
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average of 4 35.3 seconds to reach a solution.

Again, only

groups that actually got a given rule right were included in
this analysis.

The difference was statistically significant

(p < .025).
So, given that interacting groups and the best co-acting
individual do not differ in performance, the co-acting indi
viduals are more efficient problem-solvers:

they take less

time.
Standard repeated-measures analyses of time and card
number were also performed— to see if time and cards to com
pletion changed across the four rules.

Those groups who did

not solve a particular rule were assigned the time and card
number at which they gave up.

Because all groups had to play

60 cards, those groups who played 60 and could not make a
guess were assigned a card-number of 61:

it would have taken

at least 61 cards for them to come up with a guess.
The problem with doing the standard repeated-measures
analysis of all these scores is that groups who solved a
given rule almost invariably took less time and cards than
those groups that kept wrestling with the problem until close
to the time-limit.

Even though the difference was not signif

icant, less co-acting individuals— particularly in the co
acting confirmatory cell— solved rules than interacting groups.
A difference in time-to-completion, therefore, reflects a dif
ference in solutions as well as a difference in times, because
groups that failed to solve tended to take much longer.
But the analysis is valuable as a supplement to the time
and card-to-solution analyses.

Also, it provides another
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check on task difficulty:

if the tasks are increasingly dif

ficulty, we would expect them to take more cards and time to
solve as we progress from one to four.
There is a significant task effect on cards-to-completion
(F(3,108) = 9.7, p < .0001) and on time-to-completion
(F(3,108) = 19, p

<

.0001).

(See Appendix for source tables.)

A look at the means shows that the rules did generally in
crease in difficulty:
Rule 1

Rule 2

Rule 3

Rule 4

31

35

41

49

433

537

689

670

Cards-to-completion
Time-to-completion
(in seconds)

The last two rules do not differ in the amount of time it
takes to solve them, but otherwise, time and number of cards
increase in linear fashion across the four rules.

The rules

do appear to increase in difficulty, although fatigue effects
may play a role in decreased performance, especially on the
last rule.
The time analysis also showed the same main-effect that
was revealed by the time-to-solution analysis.

Interacting

groups do take longer than the best co-acting individuals,
even when time-to-completion is used as the criterion
(F(1,36) = 4.26, p < .05).
Interacting Groups Vs. the Best Co-Actor Across All Four Rules
Steiner (1972) predicted that interacting groups would
perform better than the best of an equal number of individuals
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on a divisible task.

If the four Eleusis rules are treated

as parts of a single, divisible task, interacting groups
should be more successful than the best co-actor, when 'best'
is defined as the individual in each co-acting group who is
most successful across the four rules.
For the present comparison, a single co-actor was selected
from each group:

the one who got the most rules right, using

the least amount of time and cards (if two or more indivi
duals solved the same number of rules).
was used.

One other criterion

In one or two cases, one individual solved the

first or second rule and another solved the third or fourth.
Since rules three and four are clearly more difficult than
one and two, in cases where two or more co-actors were tied
in number of solutions within the group the best co-actor
was the one who solved the higher rules.
The difference between the performance of the interacting
groups and the best co-actor across all four rules is margin
ally significant (F(l,36) = 2.93, p < .095).

(See Appendix

for source table.)
Comparing interacting groups and the best co-actor
across four tasks on the time- and cards-to-completion
dependent measures revealed no significant differences (see
Appendix for source tables).

The best co-actor across the

set of problems requires the same amount of time and infor
mation to see each solution as an interacting group.
Do Interacting Groups Solve a Higher Percentage of Problems
Than Co-Actors?
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This comparison corresponds to the one used by Marjorie
Shaw in her classic (19 32) study of differences between group
and individual problem-solving.

Here is a breakdown of per

centages of correct solutions, task-by-task:
Rules

Interacting Groups Who Solved
Total Interacting Groups

Co-Acting Solvers
#Co-Acting Individuals

1

18/20

90%

32/80

40%

2

17/20

85%

35/80

44%

3

16/20

80%

24/80

30%

4

12/20

60%

13/80

16%

There is no statistical test that can be used to deter
mine whether these differences arose by chance— but this kind
of difference has been found consistently in studies over the
years (Davis, 1969; Steiner, 1972).
finding.

It is a stable, reliable

In this study, interacting groups were successful

79% of the time; co-acting individuals were successful only
33% of the time.
So, interacting groups solved more Eleusis rules than
co-acting individuals.

Interacting groups also solved more

rules than the best of an equal number of co-actors when
'best' means most successful across all four rules.

But

interacting groups were no more successful than the best of
an equal number of co-actors when 'best' means most successful
on each rule.
Mistakes
The number of cards each group got wrong was analyzed
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using a repeated-measures ANOVA.

In this case, the dependent

measure was number of cards wrong out of the total of sixty
each group played on each rule.
Source

SS

C

6

1

S

158

1

CS

71.5

Er

900.1

T

df

1

F
.2
6.3* p<.02
2.9

36

2907.8

3

46.2* pc.0001

CT

128.2

3

2

ST

197.5

3

3.1* p<.05

CST

10.7

3

Er

63.6

.2

108

There is a significant main-effect for strategy.

Dis

confirmatory groups made an average of about twenty mistakes
per rule, whereas confirmatory groups made only eighteen.
The difference, although statistically significant, is quite
small.

There is also a significant strategy-by-task inter

action, reflecting the fact that confirmatory groups made
more mistakes on rule 1, but disconfirmatory groups made more
mistakes on the other three rules.
Rule 1

Rule 2

Rule 3

Rule

Confirmatory

26

15.2

19.6

12.6

Disconfirmatory

24. 3

17.6

23.4

16

Overall

25.1

16.4

21.5

14. 3
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The scores in the table are all means.

Note the large dif

ferences in number of cards wrong across the four rules:
one and three produced many more mistakes than two and four.
Rule four, in particular, was designed to make it easy to get
cards right:

subjects can alternate colors, or odds and

evens, or play cards in order and never get a card wrong.
Disconfirmatory groups got many more cards wrong on rule four
than confirmatory groups; the difference on this rule alone
was highly significant (F(l,36) = 6.27, p < .017).

But there

was no accompanying difference in performance.
When a regression is performed relating mistakes to
2
correct solutions on rule four, r equals .08. This means
that mistakes are very poor predictors of success on rule 4.
Across all four rules, mistakes are even worse predictors:
r

2

= .03.

Getting cards wrong apparently does not make it

any easier for groups to arrive at the correct solution.
Other Factors That Affect Group Performance
The questionnaires subjects filled-out at the end of
the experiment were analyzed to see if any of their answers
predicted their performance.

Two dependent variables were

used in these regressions.
One was number of correct solutions.

But this variable

was computed in a way that reflected the relative difficulties
of each rule.

Rules one and two were assigned a value of one

point apiece, rule three was assigned a value of two points
and rule four was worth three points.

The values reflect the

fact that approximately equal numbers of groups solved rules
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one and two, many less solved rule three and still less solved
rule four (see page 42).

Why use points at all?

Because a

group that solved only rule four and a group that solved only
rule one are not equal in performance:

the group that solved

rule four is clearly superior, as that rule is much more
difficult.
When ANOVAs are done using points as the dependent measure
instead of the repeated-measures approach to analyzing per
formance, there is still no difference in performance across
the strategy and communication independent variables.

(See

Appendix for source tables.)
The second dependent-measure used in the regression anal
yses was group rank.

All groups were ranked on two factors—

the quality of their solutions, based on success points, and
how many cards they used.

The highest group, for example,

took 61 cards to score seven points (get all four rules right).
This particular group was interacting, as were all of the
top five groups.

A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the

difference between the ranks achieved by interacting and co
acting groups was not significant, U = 224, p < .12.
The top group also included three seniors, each of whom
had taken a large number of science and math courses.

The

worst group (co-acting and confirmatory) was composed en
tirely of freshmen who had almost no science and math back
ground.

They failed to get a single rule right.

Perhaps class rank and number of mathematics and science
courses were related to success.

These factors were used as
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lone predictors of success and rank, or combined to see if
several variables taken together made better predictions than
one variable alone.
There were four individual scores for class rank, science
courses, etc. within each group.

These scores were summed to

produce a single group predictor score.

Class rank, for

example, was scored on a one through four scale, where one
equals freshman and four equals senior.

A group of four

seniors would have a total class rank of sixteen.

Number of

mathematics and science courses were also summed within each
group.

Sums were used instead of individual scores because

group members' performances were not independent:

how one

group member performed affected how all the others performed.
In the interacting groups, all members made a single guess,
together.

In the co-acting groups, the best individual on

each rule was used.

But even his or her success was affected

by the cards other group members played.

A separate set of

regressions were done using each co-acting individuals' rank
and class scores to predict his or her success, and the pre
dictive power was virtually nil (see Appendix for details).
2

A table of r s is presented below.

Each r

2

represents

the percentage of variance accounted for by each variable,
or combination of variables.

F-ratios were computed, com

paring the amount of predicted variance to the amount of error
variance.

These F-values are not included in the table below,

but p-values

denoting their levels of significance are placed
2

next to the appropriate r s.
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Source

r

2

Success

r

2

Rank

# Science Classes

.04

.09

# Mathematics Classes

.07

.1*

Class Rank

.08

.16* p<.01

Class, Science and Math

.09

.17

Science and Math

.08

.13

Class and Science

.09

.16* p<.05

Class and Math

.09

.16*

p<.05

No factor was very good at predicting group perfor
mance, in terms of number and quality of solutions.

But class

rank and number of mathematics classes, singly and together,
managed to account for at least ten per cent of the variance
on the rank dependent measure.

It is true that seniors who

have good science and mathematics backgrounds are likely to
do better on the task than freshmen with little science back
ground— but that prediction is very uncertain.

What little

relationship there is depends heavily on the fact that the
first group had three senior science students in it and the
fortieth group had four freshmen with no science background.
Even in that top group, the one freshman made important con
tributions:
without her.

the three seniors would not have done as well
It is clear that class rank, science and math

background are only minor factors in achieving correct solu
tions to the four rules.
The questionnaire also asked subjects to rate their pre
vious card-playing experience on a scale from one to five,
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where one equals almost no previous experience with card games
and five equals extensive experience.

Using card-playing

experience to predict success produced an r

2

equal to .003.

Card-playing experience was no help on the four rules.
Subjects were also asked to rate, on a scale from one
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree) whether they
agreed with the following statement:

"If I am going to play

cards I would rather play an easy game than a difficult thought
game."

Responses to this question were used to predict cor2

rect solutions; the resulting r

equaled .1.

Those subjects

that prefer difficult games do slightly, but not significant
ly, better on the four rules than subjects that prefer
easier games.
When class rank and the difficult/easy question are
combined as predictors of success, r
2

r

2

= .17.

But even this

is not significant even though it is higher than some of
2

the r s on the previous page.

The associated degrees-of-

freedom are smaller— because the difficult/easy question only
appeared on a later version of the questionnaire:
thirty of the forty groups saw it.

about

The lower number of sub

jects meant that degrees-of-freedom were lower and the errorterm was larger.
The questionnaires did not discover factors that ac
counted for a large part of the variance on the four Eleusis
rules.

Of the independent variables, only differences be

tween the four rules seemed consistently related to number of
correct solutions.

In the next section, the implications of

these results will be discussed.

IV.

Discussion

The results of the present study replicate previous
findings in the literature, using a novel task and design.
Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney (1977) found that instructing sub
jects to use either a confirmatory or a disconfirmatory strat
egy did not affect their performance.

Similar training also

had no effect in the present study.
Marjorie Shaw's (1932) observation that interacting
groups solve a higher percentage of problems than individuals
working separately was replicated in the present study, with
co-acting individuals playing the role of individuals working
separately.
Steiner's (19 72) argument that interacting groups should
do better on a divisible task than the best of an equal num
ber of individuals working separately was also supported.

If

interacting groups are compared with the best co-actor in
each group across all four rules— with the rules consti
tuting four phases of a single task— then interacting groups
do perform slightly (but not significantly) better.

In

several interacting groups, one member solved rule three and
communicated his or her solution to the others, making it
possible for someone else to see the solution to rule four.
Rule four is very hard to get if one has not seen the oddeven pattern on rule three.
The interacting/co-acting difference on this comparison
55
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might have been greater if interacting group members brought
non-redundant resources to the task (Steiner, 1972).

If

each group member has special skills suited to a different
aspect of a divisible task, then the group should perform
much better than an equal number of individuals.

Not even an

Einstein could have developed the atomic bomb working alone,
because the task required a coordinated effort on the part of
chemists, physicists, engineers, politicians, etc.
Results also replicate the classic findings of Marquart
(1955) and others (Steiner, 1972) that interacting groups per
form no better and take more time on a single, non-divisible
task than the best of an equivalent number of individuals
working separately.

According to the Lorge-Solomon model,

on a Eureka-type task, the performance of interacting groups
should equal 1 - Qn , where Q is the probability that one in
dividual selected at random will not be able to solve the
problem and n equals the size of the group.

In the present

study, we can estimate Q by taking the probability that a
single co-acting individual will solve a given rule.
On rule four, for example, thirteen out of eighty co
acting individuals were successful, so Q equals .84.

Then

the probability that an interacting group will solve rule
four equals 1 - (.84)^, or fifty per cent.

Half the inter

acting groups, according to the Lorge-Solomon model, should
have solved rule four.

Actually, 60% did.

is smaller on the other rules.

The discrepancy

On every rule, the Lorge-

Solomon model predicts performance accurately.
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The interacting/co-acting comparison bears an almost
perfect

resembance to the interacting/concocted comparison.

Interacting groups performed exactly as we would have expected
from the literature, and co-acting individuals performed in
a manner similar to individuals working separately.
Co-acting groups do share some information.

If one mem

ber plays cards sufficient to reveal the solution to one
rule, it is quite possible that others will pick up on it.
Still, in twenty-six out of the sixty solutions achieved by
co-acting groups were the work of one person alone:

no one

else in the same group saw them.
Since there was no control group in which individuals
worked on Eleusis alone, we cannot be certain that the best
co-acting individuals would not have performed better than
the best of a concocted group— but it is not likely, consider
ing that the interacting/co-acting difference mirrors the in
teracting/concocting difference.
Why Do Interacting Groups Perform So Poorly?
Interacting groups clearly have an advantage over co
acting groups on tasks that require a division of labor and
in situations where group members have non-redundant re
sources.

But if an interacting group is poorly organized,

members will not be able to take advantage of one another's
resources and the group's product, even on a divisible task,
will be no better than that of a co-acting group.

This phe

nomenon is referred to as 'process loss' in the group
problem-solving literature (Hoffman, 1979).

The process by

which group members try to arrive at a decision is often so
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inefficient that the group performs at a level far below its
potential.

That is why the Lorge-Solomon model tends to

over-predict group performance on a Eureka-type task.
Steiner lists some reasons why groups might perform
more poorly than expected on a Eureka task:

"(1) The group

will fail if none of its members possesses the resources
demanded by the task.

(2) The group will fail, or will func

tion at a reduced level of effectiveness, if its processes
are not in accord with task prescriptions.

This will be the

case if (a) the member(s) with the necessary resources does
not use them to perform the unitary task; or (b) members with
the necessary resources use them appropriately, but other
members do not accept their contributions as the group's
product (i.e., successful members are not accorded total
weight)." (Steiner, 1972, p. 24).

An example of a situation

where process-loss occurs is a study by Torrance (1954).
asked B-26 bomber crews to solve a simple problem.

He

The pilots,

who were the commanders of the crews, were most successful
at getting their opinions accepted, even when they were wrong.
The leader or the majority in a group can ignore the opinions
of those who are right.
It was hard for groups in the present study to organize,
because most members began the sessions as strangers.

One

of the best interacting groups included two friends, one of
whom became the group leader and the other of whom adopted
a secretarial role, writing out the group's guesses.

This

group's organization was aided by the fact that the two
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friends slipped comfortably into their roles, the one domi
nant, the other submissive.

In the group that did the best,

three members were friends, and worked together smoothly.
But many groups in which the members were strangers did
well and some in which there were friends did poorly.

If

the right atmosphere prevails and group members learn to work
together, even strangers will be able to accomplish things
they could not do separately.

Perhaps the best example of

this phenomenon is a group which included two foreign stu
dents who spoke little English.

The two English-speaking

students concentrated so much time and energy on explaining
the rules to the two foreign students that they were forced
to study their ideas carefully.

The foreign students reci

procated the others' concentration.

The result was a group

in which everyone worked hard and made important contribu
tions.

This group missed the first rule, but got the other

three.

Had these individuals worked as a co-acting group,

the foreign students would not have been able to understand
the rules at all.

Unfortunately, due to a procedural error

by the experimenter, the data from this group had to be drop
ped from that analysis.
The five best groups, including three that got all four
rules using less than a hundred cards, were from the inter
acting condition.

A study of tapes and notes on these groups

reveals only one thing they had in common:

in all five,

more than one group member contributed significantly to
solving the rules.
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In two of the worst five interacting groups, one member
dominated discussion and lead the group on a false track:
persistently looking for a color pattern on rule three in
one case.

More than one person tried to contribute in the

other three 'worst groups,' but the group still fell into a
'set,' focusing on an irrelevant dimension.

One group, for

example, looked at differences between cards in terms of how
many cards one had to 'skip.'
five is a 'skip' of four cards.

A numerical difference of
Keeping track of the number

of cards skipped proved too difficult:
rules three and four.

the group missed both

If one member had seen that odd dif

ferences were the key to rule three, the group's performance
would have been much better.
So, in a successful group, members have to criticize
each other's approaches and look for alternatives.

Other

wise, the group may fall into a harmful set and focus per
sistently on an irrelevant aspect of the cards.
Disconfirmatory instructions were an attempt to get
group members to adopt a critical attitude.
tions failed:

But the instruc

the best interacting groups were evenly divi

ded between disconfirmatory and confirmatory conditions.
Instructions in the present study focused on telling subjects
to get cards wrong.

Future studies should involve techni

ques for getting interacting group members to criticize
each others' ideas and develop alternative hypotheses, in
addition to making mistakes.
Group process can be beneficial, but it can also hurt

61

performance.

A set is much harder to form in a co-acting

group; if one member focuses on an irrelevant dimension,
another member— pursuing a different strategy— will often play
a card that disconfirms the first member's idea.

Not sharing

information can have advantages as well as disadvantages.

If

one co-acting individual starts off on an irrelevant tangent,
he or she doesn't take the whole group with him or her.
For example, in one interacting group, subjects deli
berately played the same sequence of cards twice on rule
three, to see if the rule required those cards to be played
in exactly that order.

The sequence was 4, K, 6, 7, 8, 7, 4

(the subjects were ignoring color) and it was played starting
at card seven and later, starting at card twenty-nine.

The

rule in this case is odd-even, so clearly the sequence would
work every time.

All that was needed to break this sequence

was a different pattern of odds and evens.

In a co-acting

group, there is a much greater chance that such a sequence
would be broken immediately:

if one member tried to play it,

another member pursuing a different idea would disconfirm the
first member's.
Why Disconfirmatory Groups Did No Better Than Confirmatory
Co-acting groups were less likely to fall into a harmful
set because members would naturally tend to disconfirm one
anothers' ideas.

But co-acting groups also could not pursue

a consistently disconfirmatory strategy.

It was the inter

acting groups who had the greatest opportunity to take advantage
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of falsification.

But the "Good Strategies for Guessing Pat

terns" had no effect on interacting groups' performance.
A rough inspection of groups' actual strategies, using
tapes and notes, indicates that most groups followed a com
bined strategy— sometimes deliberately getting cards wrong,
other times deliberately getting them right-

Disconfirmatory

groups in general made more deliberate mistakes (see Results,
p. 49) indicating that most did try to follow their "Sugges
tions."

But the difference in number of mistakes between

confirmatory and disconfirmatory is not that great; if groups
really followed their strategies, it should have been greater.
Also, although most subjects indicated the "Good Strategies
for Guessing Patterns" were helpful, the part many remembered
best was the suggestion to "guess early, guess often."
Why did the suggestions have so little effect?

On the

questionnaire, only eighteen per cent of the subjects told to
disconfirm mentioned specifically that getting cards wrong
was helpful and only two per cent of the confirmatory subjects
mentioned that getting cards right was helpful.

The confir

matory instructions particularly made little impression on
subjects.

Part of the answer lies in the size of the indivi

dual players' card hands.

Each member of a group was given

thirteen cards from a shuffled deck at the beginning of each
rule.

If a group started playing a long string of cards that

differed by one, sooner or later one member would not have
the appropriate card— especially since group members were
only given extra cards when they made mistakes.

So that
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individual would have to play a card at random.

The card

might disconfirm the idea the group was working on.

For

example, many groups started out playing a long string of
ascending cards on rule one, e.g., A, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, J, Q.

If the next player did not have a King, he or she

might play a Jack, which would lead the group towards the
real rule:
order.

adjacent cards must differ by one, regardless of

A number of groups would have missed rule one were it

not for a random play of this nature.

The same kind of thing

happened on other rules as well.
In fact, if a random card disconfirmed an incorrect
guess on rule one, subjects were more likely to ignore con
firmatory suggestions and try to disconfirm guesses on later
rules.

One of the advantages of using a four-task sequence

is that subjects could learn better strategies for solving
rules.

By rule three or four, most groups had developed their

own way— good or bad— of tackling Eleusis problems and were
ignoring the oft-repeated suggestions.
The fact that each group had to play sixty cards on each
rule exacerbated this effect.

The probability that somewhere

in the sixty cards someone would play a random card that
revealed the rule was very large, even in the confirmatory
groups.

Often groups would fail to get the rule even when

they had full information, but the-playing of a random dis
confirmatory card increased the possibility that a group would
see the correct solution and that the group would deliberately
play disconfirmatory cards on later rules.
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So, the lack of a difference between strategy conditions
can be partially explained by the fact that subjects had
limited choices, in terms of what card to play, and they were
forced to continue playing even if they made an early guess.
'Serendipity' is a term used in science to refer to a chance
discovery.

A classic example is the case of the mold that

came in through the window and killed bacteria on one of
Alexander Fleming's cultures.

The mold produced Penicillin.

Fleming was intelligent enough to make the most of his dis
covery.

Similarly, many groups in the present study obtained

serendipitous information from a card played at random.

It

was quite common to see a group keep on playing cards that
differed by one on rule three until someone was forced to
play something out of sequence, like a Queen after a three.
The experimenter's "That's correct" was invariably followed
by exclamations of surprise.

Some groups were able to take

advantage of this kind of information; others were not.
Disconfirmatory groups still should have done somewhat
better than confirmatory.

The "Suggestions" for disconfirma

tory groups stressed looking at previous mistakes, as well as
at right answers.

In an alternating color rule, strings of

mistakes will all be of the same color:
red card, black cards under a black card.

red cards under a
In an odd-even

rule, there will be long strings of odd mistakes under some
odd cards and even mistakes under some even cards.

Apparently,

disconfirmatory groups did not make any better use of this
information than confirmatory.

65

Disconfirmatory groups should also have falsified wrong
ideas more rapidly than confirmatory; they should have re
quired less time and cards to see the correct solution.

A

group that stumbles on disconfirmatory information by chance
should discover it later than a group that is searching for
it systematically.
In summary, the hypothesis that interacting-disconfirmatory groups would do better than interacting-confirmatory
was not borne out by the evidence.

But it still may be true.

There are some procedural problems in the present study that
increase the likelihood of serendipitous disconfirmation.
What would happen if those problems were eliminated?
A Follow-Up Study
The author and several colleagues are currently conduct
ing a study designed to follow-up this dissertation and dis
cover if, under a different set of circumstances, there will
be a difference between interacting-disconfirmatory and
interacting-confirmatory groups.

The procedures were the

same as the ones used in the study described earlier except
that:
a.

Only interacting groups were run.

b.

There was only one between-groups independent variable—

strategy— with three conditions:

confirmatory, disconfirma

tory and a combined strategy, in which subjects were urged to
get cards right until they had a guess, then test that guess
by getting cards wrong.
c.

Each subject was given a full deck of cards to play from.
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Every time he or she played a card, it was immediately re
placed.

This meant that each subject could always play what

ever card he or she wanted.
d.

Groups were allowed to stop working on a rule whenever

they were sure they were right.
Procedures c and d insured that confirmatory groups poten
tially could play a whole string of right answers without
serendipitous disconfirmation, then quit and go on to the
next rule without ever getting full, correct information.
On rule three, for example, a confirmatory group could play
thirty cards that went up and down by ones and stop, con
vinced that they had the rule— when the rule was actually odd
and even cards must alternate.
The time and card number data have not been completely
analyzed, but there is a strong difference between confirma
tory and disconfirmatory strategies on number of correct solu
tions.

Out of eight confirmatory groups run, one solved all

four rules, one solved three, one solved one and the rest did
not solve any rules.

Furthermore, the groups that did the

worst were the ones that followed their strategy the most
closely, making almost no mistakes.
Out of eight disconfirmatory groups, three solved two
rules, three solved three rules and two solved all four.

The

combined strategy group fell in between the confirmatory and
disconfirmatory:

one group solved all four, two groups solved

three, three groups solved two and two solved one.

A three-

way ANOVA on correct solutions showed that the difference
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between these groups' performance on the strategy manipula
tion was significant, F(2,21) = 5.04, p < .02.

If all groups

had strictly followed their instructions, this difference
would be even greater.

Confirmatory groups tended to make

more mistakes than they should have, and disconfirmatory
groups got too many cards right.
It appears that interacting-disconfirmatory groups will
do better than interacting-confirmatory when members are
given maximum freedom to conduct their own experiments and
stop whenever they feel they have the right answer.

Con

firmatory groups often fell into the trap of playing a
short string of right answers and then quitting, thinking
they had found the rule.
Extending These Results to Science
The dangers of generalizing from a sample of college stu
dents solving Eleusis rules to the behavior of scientists in
the real-world were mentioned in the Introduction.

Obviously,

college students are not scientists and Eleusis is no more
than a gross oversimplification of the kinds of problems most
scientists actually face.

Keeping these caveats in mind,

let us speculate cautiously.

What do these results suggest

about how intragroup communication and the use of falsificatory strategies affect the scientific process?
1.

On a Eureka-type task, the best of a number of scientists

working separately and in limited communication with each
other will do as well as scientists who work together in a
face-to-face group.

If the object is to solve a series of

68

related Eureka-type problems, an interacting group may have
a slight advantage if individual resources are redundant
(i.e., all group members have similar training and skills)
and a large advantage if each individual has a special skill
or perspective to contribute to one or more aspects of the
problem.

Finally, the average scientist

working separately

will not do as well as a group of scientists working together.
2.

A disconfirmatory strategy will lead to superior perfor

mance in situations where scientists have the freedom to
design whatever experiments they want.

When laboratory sub

jects were given only a limited range of card-choices and were
forced to play sixty cards, a disconfirmatory strategy had
no effect.

But when subjects could play any card they wanted,

and stop any time, a disconfirmatory strategy was much more
effective than a confirmatory one.
Similarly, when scientists are limited to certain tests
and are forced— by a grant, perhaps— to gather data for an
extended period of time, serendipitous disconfirmation of the
researchers' hypotheses may occur.

The limitations on kinds

of tests may be imposed by lack of equipment, or by ethical
considerations (certain kinds of research cannot be done on
animals and human beings), or even by the nature of the uni
verse— a geologist cannot go back in time to study the Earth's
surface as it appeared millions of years ago.

In a card-

game, we can give subjects freedom to construct any test of
a rule they want, but in the real world, scientists are forced
to operate within certain constraints.
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Still, experimenters are quite adept at arranging things
so their pet hypotheses will be confirmed.

A classic demon

stration of the effect of rewards on behavior was done in
the 1940s.
the middle.

Cats were put in a cramped box with a pole in
When the cat rubbed the pole, the box opened.

The experimenters concluded that the cats learned to rub be
cause it brought about an immediate reward— release from the
box.

Thirty years later, two researchers designed a discon

firmatory study.
no reward.

They put cats in a similar box and gave them

The cats rubbed the pole repeatedly, demonstrating

that rewards had been unnecessary in the original experiment
(Garcia, 19 80).

Subjects solving Eleusis rules and scientists

trying to solve the 'rules of nature1 can both profit by
adopting a disconfirmatory strategy.
Future Research
To find out whether the ideas derived from the study of
subjects in the laboratory really generalize to the behavior
of scientists, it will be necessary to study scientists them
selves.

One way would be to bring scientists into the lab

oratory and have them work in interacting and co-acting teams
on Eleusis rules.

This kind of study should be supplemented

by work with research teams in the real world, like Mitroff's
(1974) investigation of the Apollo scientists.

Under what

circumstances is it better for scientists to wrestle with a
problem together, and when are they better off working alone?
Can scientific groups pursue a disconfirmatory strategy better
than individuals?
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More realistic laboratory simulations of science could
also be done using college students.

For example, one could

take a group of junior and senior science majors and put them
in a course designed to model the growth and development of
a science.
The students would be asked to work— together and separ
ately— on discovering the rules that govern a 'universe'
created for the purposes of the experiment.

The best way to

design such a 'universe' would be to use a computer.

Students

could work at several different terminals, trying different
experiments that would reveal the 'laws' governing the uni
verse.
The experimenter could construct laws that dictated the
behavior of particles in the imaginary universe— how they
moved, how they interacted, how they combined to form larger
bodies.

This information would have to be discovered by the

students, through clever experimentation.

The simulation could

be arranged so that it would be easy to form a simple theory
of how the universe worked— a theory that would not hold up
to rigorous, disconfirmatory testing.
Some of the contingencies that affect the progress of
science in the real world could be modeled.

Students' access

to the computer terminals could be determined by fake 'funding
agencies' that would reward only certain kinds of research—
say, those experimenters whose predictions were confirmed.
Students who did riskier projects and/or disconfirmatory
studies would have difficulty getting access to terminals.
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Academic journals could also be simulated; students could be
told to write up the results of their experiments, and ac
ceptable articles could be reproduced and distributed.

The

students with the most publications would also be permitted
more time on the computer.
The list of possible permutations is endless.

Simula

tions are far more realistic than short, little experiments.
Simulations are also far more expensive and time-consuming.
But the potential rewards are tremendous.

One could actually

model the growth of a science under circumstances where key
factors in scientific progress could be manipulated to assess
their effects.

This kind of work could even involve actual

scientists as consultants and participants.
Simulation is not the only way to study the scientific
process, but it is a method whose possibilities have not been
fully realized.

One possibility is to give subjects mone

tary rewards for either getting cards right (confirmatory
strategy) or getting them wrong (disconfirmatory strategy).
Even in my most recent study, groups showed a tendency to
disregard their strategy instructions.

Perhaps a monetary

contingency would convince groups to adhere more closely to
their strategies, and give a clearner test of the differences
between confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies.
Another possible way of obtaining the same information
would be to ask groups to concentrate solely on either getting
cards right or getting them wrong.

After each group had played

a certain number of right or wrong cards in a row (depending
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on which strategy it had been asked to adopt) the experimenter
could ask the group to guess the rule.

Groups that could

not follow their strategy would be dropped from the analysis.
Note that the focus here is on playing long strings of right
or wrong cards, not on guessing the rule.

This design would

permit an assessment of how well subjects could create and
make use of pure confirmatory or disconfirmatory information.
While several groups in my most recent study played a pure
confirmatory strategy, no group has ever played a pure dis
confirmatory strategy.
Other ideas for future research include a questionnaire
that assesses how well scientists employ modus tolens on
Eleusis rules and a computer program that plays Eleusis,
which a colleague of mine is working on.

The computer's per

formance using confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies
could be compared with that of human subjects.
The experiment outlined in these pages has already begun
to fulfill its primary purpose:

to suggest new ways of

simulating how science works in the laboratory.

Another

possible offshoot of the research presented here is techni
ques to improve group problem-solving in general.

A good

strategy for a group might be to generate ideas in a brain
storming session, then attempt to disconfirm each idea,
using individual group member's unique resources and back
grounds to come up with falsificatory evidence.

The efficacy

of this and other group problem-solving techniques can be
investigated in further experimental simulations, coupled with
observations of groups outside the laboratory.

APPENDIX
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APPENDIX
ADDENDA TO THE RESULTS SECTION
Interacting Groups vs. the Best Co-Actor on Each Rule
ANOVA on number of correct solutions, Rule 4:

(See page 43

for discussion)
F

Source

SS

df

C

.1

1

.4

S

.4

1

1.6

CS

.4

1

1.6

Er

9.0

36

ANOVA on the number of cards required to reach a solution:
(See page 43 for discussion)
Source

SS

df

F

C

15. 7

1

.05

S

93.8

1

.33

CS

215. 3

1

.75

Er

33871.0

118

ANOVA on cards-to-completion:

(See page 46 for discussion)
F

Source

SS

df

C

65

1

.1

S

140

1

.2

CS

722

1

1. 3

Er

19998

36
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Source

SS

df

T

7532

3

CT

247

3

.3

ST

494

3

.6

CST

158

3

.2

27891

108

Er

F
9.7* p<.009

:he card-number distribution approximate normality/
•e was transformed by taking its logarithm to the
The following source tables resulted:
solution:
Source

SS

df

F

C

.0004

1

.006

S

.04

1

.56

CS

.13

1

.98

Er

7.69

119

SS

df

completion:
Source

F

C

.007

1

.08

S

.052

1

.57

CS

.253

1

2.75

Er

3. 311

36

T

1.6

3

10.03* p<.001

CT

.05

3

.32

ST

.07

3

.45

CST

.1

3

.61

Er

5. 77

108
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The pattern of results is no different after transformation.
Time-to-completion:
Source

(See page 44 for discussion)
df

SS

4.26* p<. 05

C

1158891

1

S

1080

1

CS

298166

1

Er

9782093

36

T

7844208

3

CT

282302

3

.68

ST

443671

3

1.077

CST

155527

3

.38

14830259

108

Er

.004
1. 1

19.04* p<.001

A square-root transformation was used to make the distinction
of times approximate normality.

The following source tables

resulted:
Time-to-solution:
Source
C

SS

df

275

1

4.64* p<.05

S

1.3

1

.022

CS

2.6

1

.043

Er

7075.4

119

Time-to-completion:
Source

df

SS

C

373.7

1

S

.4

1

3.49
.004
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Source

SS

CS

109.

Er

3854.7

T

2911.

df
1

F
1.02

36
3

18.33* p<.001

CT

30.5

3

.19

ST

138.4

3

.87

CST

14.3

3

.09

Er

5716

108

The (+) denotes a marginally significant communication maineffect (p < .07).

So, the transformation slightly reduces

the effect of the communication variable on time, but does
not affect the overall pattern of results.
Interacting Groups vs. the Best Co-Actor
Across All Four Rules
ANOVA on number of correct solutions:

(See page 47 for

discussion)
Source

SS

df

F
2.93

.05

1

.22

CS

.51

1

1.96

Er

9.28

36

•

in
r-

1

C
S

The (+) denotes a marginally-significant communication maineffect (p < .095).

The within-group part of the analysis

showed the usual main-effect for task— later rules are more
difficult to solve than earlier ones— and no interactions.
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On page 47, the reader is referred to this appendix for
source tables comparing interacting groups and the best co
actor across the four rules on time- and card-to-solution.
Only the source tables for transformed data will be reported
here, because the transformed time and card scores come closer
to satisfying the assumptions of the analysis-of-variance.
(Analyses were also performed on the raw scores; the F-ratio
for the communication main-effect on the time dependent
measure was slightly higher than the same F-ratio for squareroot- time— but neither was significant at the .05 level.)
Square-root of time-to-solution:
df

F

Source

SS

C

168.13

1

2.79

S

1. 89

1

.03

CS

.85

1

.01

Er

6740.93

112

i to the base ten of cards -to-solution:
Source

SS

df

F

C

.008

1

.14

S

.001

1

.02

CS

.04

1

.65

Er

6. 83

112

Using points as a dependent-measure
On pages 50 and 51, a system of points that weights each
rule according to its relative difficulty is described.

When
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these points are used as the dependent-measure in a 2 X 2
ANOVA, the following source table results:
Source

SS

df

F

C

2.5

1

.59

S

1.6

1

.38

CS

8.1

Er

153.4

1

1.8

36

None of these F-ratios comes close to significance.

When the

same ANOVA is performed using the point-totals for the best
co-actor across the four rules, there are still no significant
differences.
Regressions using individual co-actors' scores:
for discussion)
Source

r2

Class Rank

.02

Science Courses

.0007

Math Courses

.01

(See page 52
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